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Case No. 20100947-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Michelle Ann Cox, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for forgery, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2009), and theft by deception, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2004). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The trial court instructed the jurors on all the elements of theft by deception 
and forgery. The court instructed that they could find Defendant guilty of the 
offenses only if they were convinced that "each and every element had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt." R89,92. 
The court also instructed that "[i]t is a defense to theft by deception that the 
Defendant... acted under an honest belief that she had a right to obtain or exercise 
control over the property." F94. That instruction further stated: "Evidence of this 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
defense must be presented by the defense, and if presented[,] the State retains its 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of the offense charged/' 
Id. 
Defendant now raises an unpreserved claim that the last sentence of the 
''honest belief instruction "unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof on both 
the theft-by-deception and forgery charges. 
la. Should this Court review this claim for plain error or manifest injustice, 
where Defendant invited the error below? 
i 
Standard of Review. A party who invites error is precluded from subsequently 
obtaining appellate review for plain error or manifest injustice. State v. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 16, t 9, 86 P.3d 742. 
lb. Has Defendant shown that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
"honest belief instruction where the instruction expressly stated that the State 
retained the burden of proof? 
Standard of Review. '" An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
4 
first time on appeal presents a question of law/" State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, \ 16, 247 
P.3d 344 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162). 
2. Should this Court remand for Defendant to receive the benefit of the lesser 
penalty afforded by an amended statute that took effect after her conviction but 
before her sentencing? 
2 
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Standard of Review. Whether a defendant is "entitled to a lesser sentence when 
the legislature reduces the penalty for the crime charged after conviction but before 
sentencing" is a question of law. State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136,138 (Utah App. 1996). 
But, as explained below, the State concedes this point. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are included in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (West 2004) (presumptions and defenses); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2004) (theft by deception); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (West 2004) (classification of theft offenses); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (West Supp. 2011) (classification of theft 
offenses); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2009) (forgery). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the facts. 
The offense. On September 10,2009, Kathy Aller parked her 1996 Chevrolet 
Cavalier at the University of Utah Medical Center, where she worked as an 
administrative assistant. R152:138-39. She left her bag inside and locked the car 
with the windows open a few inches; she planned just to drop off some papers and 
make a short visit to a friend. R152:139. 
When she returned just after 6:00 p.m., her bag was gone. R152:139-40,148. 
She called University Campus Police to report the missing bag. Because her bag 
contained blank checks and credit and debit cards, she went to her credit union 
3 
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early the next morning to report the theft. R152:147. She was too late. A check had 
been cashed against her account at 10:08 a.m. R152:185. 
The $360 check was made out to Defendant Michelle Cox. See State's Exhibit 
B. Surveillance video showed Defendant cashing the check. See R152:163-64; see also 
State's Exhibit F. The teller requested and Defendant showed her identification. 
R152.162. Defendant endorsed the check. State's Exhibit B; R156:305. Defendant 
i 
later admitted to writing in her name as the payee and to filling in the written 
amount of the check, i.e., the amount in words. R156:305. She also later admitted to 
I 
driving to the bank with Zach Garcia, who allegedly stole the bag and the checks, 
and Katrina (or Catrina) Dominguez, Defendant's friend and Garcia's girlfriend. 
R156:303, 357. Defendant also admitted calling the bank before traveling there to 
make sure that the check would clear. R156:302. 
The investigation—Defendant's account After receiving a packet from the 
credit union's fraud investigators and a copy of the check, Salt Lake City Police 
Detective Brenden Kirkwood contacted Defendant. R156:246. During the 
investigation he spoke by telephone with Defendant on several different occasions. 
R156:248-68. Defendant admitted cashing the check, but gave several different 
stories about how she came to possess it. R156:250; see also R156:248-68. 
Defendant first told Detective Kirkwood that she had received the check as 
payment for a service she had provided. R156:250. She claimed to be a manicurist 
4 
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who had done manicures for a party of twelve people. Id. When asked who could 
verify this, Defendant replied that her supervisor, Sue Sandoval, could. Id. But 
when Kirkwood called Sandoval, she could not verify Defendant's story. R156:251. 
Moreover, Sandoval advised Kirkwood that Defendant was not licensed to perform 
manicures. R156:252. 
So Kirkwood called Defendant back. Id. This time Defendant asserted that 
she had done the manicures for her friend Katrina Dominguez, but had done them 
in her own home rather than at the salon. Id. When Kirkwood told Defendant he 
was going to call Dominguez, Defendant gave a third story. R156:253. She still 
claimed that she got the check from Dominguez, but said "it was to cover gas that 
[Dominguez] had pumped at a station for an unknown female." R156:253. 
Defendant claimed that Dominguez "put the gas on her debit card, received the 
check in exchange for the gas of this unknown individual," and then gave the check 
to Defendant to cash for her. R156:253. When Kirkwood called Dominguez, she 
said she received the check as a payment from an unknown female for pumping gas 
for her. R156:253-54. 
Defendant's last account to Kirkwood was that Dominguez's mother gave 
Dominguez the check, but that Dominguez could not cash it because she had 
"account issues." R156:254. Defendant believed that Dominguez had signed the 
check. R156:256. Defendant claimed that Dominguez offered Defendant money to 
5 
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cash the check. R156:267. Defendant said that she received $60 for cashing the 
check. Id. 
The investigation—Katrina Dominguez's account. Dominguez did not 
testify. SeeR152,156. Detective Kirkwood testified to her account. See R156:267-76. 
As stated, Dominguez initially told Detective Kirkwood that she had received the 
check for purchasing gas for an unknown female. R156:269. Kirkwood obtained 
Dominguez's debit card transactions record, which showed no gas purchase for the 
date claimed. Id. When Kirkwood confronted Dominguez with this discrepancy, 
she admitted that she had lied and there had been no gas pumping. R156:269-70. 
Dominguez now said that she found the checkbook outside Defendant's apartment, 
believed that it belonged to a friend of Defendant, and returned the checkbook to 
Defendant. R156:270. She claimed that Defendant cashed one of the checks from 
the checkbook and then gave her $60 for finding it. R156:271. Dominguez later 
admitted lying about this. R156:276. She then told Detective Kirkwood that her 
boyfriend Zach Garcia burglarized a vehicle and stole the checks; she and 
Defendant devised the gas-pumping story; Defendant cashed the check; and she 
and Defendant split the proceeds so that each received $150. Id. 
i 
Defendant's trial testimony. At trial, Defendant admitted cashing the check, 
but claimed that she did not know that it was stolen. R156:295. She testified that 
her friend Dominguez came to her saying that she had a check from her mother that 
6 
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she needed to cash. R156:301. Defendant claimed that Dominguez said that she 
could not cash it herself because she had problems with her account. Id. Defendant 
agreed to cash the check, which had already been signed with the $360 numeric 
amount already written in. R156:301,305. Defendant said she printed her name on 
the payee line and filled in the written amount of the check. R156:305. She called 
the bank to make sure that the account had sufficient funds to cover the check. 
R156:302. Defendant, Dominguez, and Garcia then drove to the bank, where 
Defendant presented and endorsed the check at the teller station. R156:305. She 
said that Dominguez gave her $60 for cashing the check. R156:306. 
Defendant denied telling Detective Kirkwood that she received a check for 
doing the pedicure party. R156:308. She testified that she had only tried to explain 
to the detective that Dominguez had asked her about "possibly doing a pedicure 
party for about 12 people." Id. 
B. Summary of the proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with forgery and theft by deception. Rl-3. A 
jury found her guilty on both counts. R97. The trial court sentenced Defendant on 
the forgery conviction to an indeterminate prison term of up to five years, 
suspended execution of the prison term in favor of a 365-day jail term, and 
suspended all but thirty days of that term. R107. The court sentenced her on the 
theft-by-deception conviction to a 365-day jail term and suspended all 365 days. Id. 
7 
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4 
Defendant timely appealed. R124. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT < 
Jury Instruction No. 33 stated that it was a defense to theft by deception that 
Defendant acted in the "honest belief7 that she had a right to obtain the property 
she took. The last sentence of the instruction stated that evidence of this defense 
must be presented by the defense, and that if presented, the State retained its 
i 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the offense charged. 
Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that this sentence improperly shifted 
the burden of disproving both theft by deception and forgery to her. She also claims 
that she was entitled to be sentenced to a reduced punishment for her theft-by-
deception conviction under an amended statute that became effective after her 
conviction but before sentencing. 
la. Defendant is not entitled to review of her jury instruction claim for plain 
error or manifest injustice. Defendant invited any error when trial counsel 
affirmatively represented to the court that the instruction was correct or, at the very 
i 
least, failed to object to the instruction when the trial court specifically asked about 
it. Thus, she can succeed on this claim only if she proves ineffective assistance of 
counsel for not objecting to the instruction. 
lb. Defendant has not proven that trial counsel performed deficiently for not 
objecting to the instruction, because it was a correct statement of the law. First, by 
8 
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its express terms, the instruction did not shift the burden of proving deception; 
rather, it made clear that the burden of proof always remained on the State. Second, 
the instruction could not have shifted the burden of proof as to the forgery count, 
because, by its express terms, the instruction applied only to the theft-by-deception 
count. Defendant has not proven prejudice for essentially the same reasons. 
2. The State concedes that counsel should have alerted the trial court that 
after Defendant's conviction but before sentencing, an amended statute took effect 
that reduced the penalty for her theft-by-deception offense from a class A 
misdemeanor to a class B misdemeanor. Defendant was entitled to be sentenced to 
the lesser penalty. This Court should therefore remand for entry of the theft-by-
deception conviction and sentence as that of a class B misdemeanor. 
9 
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4 
ARGUMENT 
I. < 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HER UNPRESERVED 
CLAIM THAT THE "HONEST BELIEF" JURY INSTRUCTION 
SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO HER 
The trial court instructed the jury that it was a defense to theft by deception if 
the defendant "acted in the honest belief that she had the right to obtain . . . the 
property/7 R94. The instruction concluded with this sentence: "Evidence of this 
defense must be presented by the defense, and if presented [,] the State retains its 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of the offense charged/7 
Id. Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the last sentence of the 
instruction improperly shifted to her the burden of proving not only theft by 
i 
deception, but also the forgery. See Br. Appellant at 23-24. Because she did not 
preserve this claim below, she argues that the trial court plainly erred in giving the 
instruction as written or, alternatively that her counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the instruction. Br. Appellant at 23-26. 
Because Defendant invited any error, she is not entitled to plain error review. 
And while she is entitled to review of her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, 
she has not met the heavy burden of proving both that counsel performed 
deficiently and that counsel's failure to object prejudiced her. 
i 
10 
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A. Because defendant approved the jury instructions below, the 
invited error doctrine precludes plain error review. 
Defendant first claims that it was "plain error to instruct the jury that the 
defendant had the burden of presenting evidence that she had an honest belief that 
she was authorized to cash the check." Br. Appellant at 23 (italics and underlining 
omitted). Defendant correctly notes that the "plain error standard of review is also 
intended to avoid manifest injustice" and that the terms "plain error" and "manifest 
injustice" have been described as being essentially synonymous. Id. (citing State v. 
Alinas, 2007 UT 83, | 10,171 P.3d 1046) (internal quotation marks omitted). But 
Defendant is not entitled to plain error or manifest injustice review because she 
affirmatively approved the jury instructions below. 
Proceedings below. Before taking evidence on the second and last day of 
trial, the trial court discussed the jury instructions with the parties. Defense counsel 
objected to one instruction—unrelated to the issue here —and the prosecutor 
withdrew it. R156:221-23. The court then asked defense counsel, "Okay, so then for 
the record, to make it absolutely clear, neither the State nor the defense has any jury 
instructions objections in this case; correct, [counsel]?" R156:223. Defense counsel 
apparently responded affirmatively and non-verbally, because the transcript does 
not indicate any response from her. See id. When the court then asked about the 
parties7 preferences concerning the order of the instructions, both parties agreed to 
have the court determine the order of the instructions. See R156:223-24. The court 
11 
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also asked the parties if they would like an instruction about Defendant's right to 
testify or not testify. R156:224. The prosecutor said that he did, and defense counsel 
questioned Defendant on the record to show that Defendant knew that she did not 
have to testify, but that she wanted to take the stand. R156:224-25. I 
Minutes later, the prosecutor asked that all objections to questions and 
testimony be discussed outside the jury's presence. R156:234. The prosecutor then 
stated, "[0]ther than that, I have no objections to the instructions the Court is 
intending to give and no objections to the Court's not giving mine." R156:235. 
I 
Before bringing in the jury, the court asked defense counsel, "[D]id you have 
anything else you wanted to add?" Id. The record indicates that defense counsel 
gave "[n]o verbal response." Id. 
Relevant law. Under the invited error doctrine, "a party on appeal cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 26, 153 P.3d 804 
(quotations and citation omitted). A party invites error when she makes 
"[affirmative representations that [she] has no objection to the proceedings . 
because such representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed 
< 
without further consideration of the issues." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 16,128 
P.3d 1171. In the context of jury instructions, a defendant invites error when she 
"affirmatively approve[s] of the jury instructions at trial." Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 
12 
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511, f 26 (alteration in original). Thus, where counsel "confirmfs] on the record that 
the defense had no objection to the instructions given by the trial court/' or even 
"fail[s] to object to an instruction when specifically queried by the court/7 the 
invited error doctrine applies. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT16,110. A party who invites 
error is precluded from subsequently obtaining appellate review for plain error or 
manifest injustice. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, t 9; Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 26. 
Defendant invited any error in the instructions here. As explained, when 
asked, counsel effectively confirmed on the record that she had no objections to the 
jury instructions. See R156:223. At the very least, she failed to object to the 
instructions when specifically queried by the court. See id. In so doing, Defendant 
invited any error, and she is not entitled to review of her claim for plain error or 
manifest injustice. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1108-09 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1023 (Utah 
1987). 
13 
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4 
B. Because the "honest belief" jury instruction did not shift the 
burden of proof to Defendant, Defendant has not shown that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to it. i 
Defendant alternatively claims that "[d]efense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to an instruction which deprived [her] client of a fundamental 
constitutional protection/7 i.e., an instruction that "shiftfed] the burden of proof to 
the defendant/7 Br. Appellant at 24,26 (italics and underlining omitted). 
i 
Defendant claims that the final sentence of this instruction unconstitutionally 
shifted to her the burden of proving not only the deception element of theft 
deception, but also the fraud element of forgery. Br. Appellant at 10-26. Defendant 
asserts that because the last sentence required her "to present evidence that she had 
an honest belief that her representations were true or that she had an honest claim of 
right to the property she obtained," it "unconstitutionally shifted the burden of 
proof to [her] to disprove required elements of the charged offense[s]." Id. at 7.1 
Defendant thus argues that her counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
instruction. Id. at 24-26. Defendant has not met her heavy burden to show both 
deficient performance and prejudice. 
1
 Defendant claims only that the jury instruction unconstitutionally shifted the 
burden of proof on the deception element of theft by deception and the fraud 
element of forgery. See Br. Appellant at 15-21. She does not claim that the 
instruction shifted the burden on any other element of either offense. See id. 
i 
14 
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Jury instructions. The jury was repeatedly instructed that the defendant was 
presumed innocent and the State had the burden to prove all of the elements of each 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt: 
'The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge/7 (Instruction 5, R77); 
'The prosecution has the burden of proof The defendant is not required 
to prove innocence —you must start by assuming it According to our law, 
the defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt." (Instruction 15, R81); 
"Before you can give up your assumption [that] the defendant is innocent, 
you must be convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." (Instruction 16, R81); 
"Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be 
enough evidence—direct, circumstantial, or some of both—to convince you of 
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Instruction 29, R87); 
"The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant acted with a particular mental state." (Instruction 30, R88); 
"You cannot convict [Defendant] of [forgery] unless you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt, based on the evidence each of the following elements 
[listing elements of forgery]— [I]f you are not convinced that one or more of 
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt then you must 
find the defendant NOT GUILTY." (Instruction 31, R89-90). 
"You cannot convict [Defendant] of [theft by deception] unless you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence each of the following 
elements [listing elements of theft by deception]. . . . [I]f you are not 
convinced that one or more of these elements has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt then you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY." 
(Instruction 32, R92-93). 
Jury Instruction No. 31 set forth the elements of forgery. It instructed that the 
jurors could not convict Defendant of forgery unless they found beyond a 
15 
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reasonable doubt that Defendant, "acting with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that she was facilitating a fraud to be perpetuated by anyone," "altered 
any writing of another without his authority or uttered the altered writing" or 
"made, completed,... or uttered any writing" so that it "purported to be the act of < 
another" or "to be an act on behalf of another party with the authority of that 
party." R89-91 (instruction set forth in its entirety in Addendum B). 
Jury Instruction No. 32 set forth the elements of theft by deception. It 
instructed the jurors that they could not convict Defendant of theft by deception 
i 
unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had obtained or 
exercised control over the property of another by deception and with a purpose to 
deprive. R92-93. This instruction explained that "deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally "[c]reates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to < 
affect... the judgment of another in the transaction." Id. (instruction set forth in its 
entirety in Addendum B). 
Jury Instruction No. 33, the challenged instruction, set forth the "honest 
belief" defense to theft by deception. It explained that Defendant had a defense to 
theft by deception if she acted "under an honest claim of right to the property," "in 
the honest belief that she had the right to obtain the property," or "honestly 
believing that the owner, if present, would have consented" to her obtaining the 
16 
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property. R94. The instruction concluded with this sentence: "Evidence of this 
defense must be presented by tlie defense, and if presented the State retains its burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of the offense charged." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Relevant law—burden of proof and jury instructions. The State bears the 
burden to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which [a defendant] is charged." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,206 
(1977), quoting In re Winskip, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 22, 232 P.3d 519. 
An appellate court reviews "a challenged jury instruction in context with all 
other jury instructions provided to the jury." State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, 
f 23,219 P.3d 75 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where "the jury 
instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error 
does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate 
as it might have been." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Relevant law—ineffective assistance, A defendant "raising an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim carries a 'heavy burden/" Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 
1046 (10th Cir. 2002). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the burden is on 
Defendant to show: "(1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and 
(2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant 
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would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 
16,89 P.3d 162 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984)). "Failure to 
satisfy either prong will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not 
ineffective/' State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 38,55 P.3d 1131.
 i 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must first show that 
trial counsel's performance was deficient—that is, that counsel's performance did 
i 
not meet an objective standard of reasonableness — by identifying specific acts or 
omissions she alleges did not result from reasonable professional judgment. 
I 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. When reviewing such a claim, courts "must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. at 689 (citation omitted). This presumption 
"derives from our common experience that attorneys, as a whole, usually represent 
their clients in a professional, competent, and reasonable manner." Bullock, 297 F.3d 
< 
at 1046. The standard is appropriately deferential, recognizing the "variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 
1254 (Utah 1993). Moreover," [u]nlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed 
the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with 
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the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge/' Harrington v. Richter, 131 
S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). 
Accordingly, "tactical decisions such as 'what witnesses to call, what 
objections to make, and, by and large, what defenses to interpose, are generally left 
to the professional judgment of counsel.'" Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, % 25,123 P.3d 
400 (quoting State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71,91 (Utah 1982)). State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 
354 (Utah App. 1993). 
Ultimately, Defendant bears the burden of "show[ing] that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 787 (quotations and citation omitted). 
As part of that burden, the defendant must show that there is no conceivable 
legitimate tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. If there is such a basis, counsel 
has not performed deficiently. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 7; State v. Holbert, 2002 UT 
App 426, If 58, 61 P.3d 291. 
Even when the presumption of competency is overcome and deficient 
performance is established, the ineffectiveness analysis does not end. A defendant 
alleging ineffectiveness must also establish prejudice, that is, "a reasonable 
probability . . . that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A reasonable probability is a one that 
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undermines confidence in the outcome. Id. "In making this determination, an 
appellate court should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such 
factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated 
effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. "And as with 
the first prong of the Strickland standard, there is a 'strong presumption' that the 
outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable." Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, 
i 
1 23,165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699). 
1. Defendant has not shown that counsel performed deficiently 
for not objecting to the final sentence of the "honest belief" I 
instruction, because it did not shift the burden of proving the 
deception element of theft by deception. 
Defendant has not shown that counsel performed deficiently. Counsel had a 
i 
legitimate reason for not objecting to the jury instruction because, when read both 
by itself and in context with all other instructions, the instruction made clear that the 
State, and only the State, had the burden of proof with respect to all the elements of 
theft by deception. By its express terms, the last sentence in the instruction did not 
shift to Defendant the burden of proving any element of theft by deception. First, 
the instruction stated that an "honest belief" that Defendant had a right to obtain the 
property constituted "a defense to the charge of theft by deception." R94 (emphasis 
added). Defendant does not challenge the correctness of this statement. The 
instruction then correctly advised the jury that Defendant had the responsibility or 
i 
burden of production to raise this defense by presenting some evidence that could 
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support it. See id. Defendant does not contest this allocation of the burden of 
production. Nor could she. Defendants typically have the burden of presenting 
some evidence of a defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-308 (West 2004) (stating that 
compulsion, entrapment, ignorance or mistake of fact, and voluntary intoxication 
may be affirmative defenses) & § 76-1-504 (West 2004) (stating that evidence of an 
affirmative defense "shall be presented by the defendant''); see also State v. Knoll, 712 
P.2d 211,215 (Utah 1985) ("As a practical matter, a defendant may have to assume 
the burden of producing some evidence of self-defense if there is no evidence in 
prosecution's case that would provide some kind of evidentiary foundation for 
claim of self-defense."). This is because evidence of many defenses, like evidence of 
a defendant's "honest belief," is most often uniquely in the position of a defendant, 
who knows what he or she thought or did at the time of the offense. A defendant 
therefore bears the burden of producing some evidence of the defense. Indeed, in 
this case, Defendant met her burden of production to present evidence of this 
defense when she put on evidence that she believed she had a right to cash the 
check. See R156:295-313.2 
2
 Defendant's only challenge to the "honest belief" instruction is that it shifts 
the burden of proof on the elements of the offense. Defendant does not argue that 
she cannot legally be required to put on some evidence of a defense or that she 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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Defendant nevertheless claims that the instruction shifted the burden of proof 
on the deception element. But the instruction did not state that an "honest belief' 
was a necessary or required defense or that Defendant's failure to produce evidence 
of the defense shifted the burden of proof from the State. See id. Moreover, the * 
instruction expressly told the jurors that if Defendant presented evidence that she 
had an "honest belief' in her right to cash the check, as Defendant did, the State still 
i 
"retainfed] its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of the 
offenses charged." R94. "All elements" necessarily included the element of 
i 
deception. See R92-93 (elements instruction on theft by deception). 
Thus, the instruction accurately instructed the jury on the law as set forth in 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977): it 
set forth the State's burden to prove all elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In addition, other instructions — Nos. 5, 15, 16, 29, 30, 31, and 32, which 
included the elements instructions —reiterated the State's burden to prove all the 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See R77,81,87,88,89-90,92-93. The elements 
i 
cannot legally be allocated the burden of production. She does not claim that the 
instruction was an affirmative defense, nor does she argue that there should have 
been a specific instruction requiring the State to disprove an affirmative defense. 
She argues only that the instruction shifted to her the burden of proving the 
elements of the offenses. The State therefore addresses only that matter. 
i 
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instructions, in fact, expressly stated that if the jurors were not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the proof of even one element of an offense, they must find the 
Defendant not guilty. See R89-90, 92. Thus, the instructions as a whole also 
accurately conveyed the State's burden. See State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, | 24,116 
P.3d 360 ("We have clearly indicated that jury instructions must be viewed as a 
whole rather than in isolated segments/') (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Thus, trial counsel had legitimate, strategic reasons for not objecting to the 
final sentence of Jury Instruction No. 13. First, the instruction was favorable to 
Defendant. It reiterated the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all 
of the elements of the defense. Second, there is nothing in the law that precludes 
requiring a defendant to bear the burden of production—to put on some evidence of 
a defense —particularly where that evidence of that defense is uniquely in her 
possession. The instruction was correct and clear about the State's burden of proof. 
Counsel could reasonably have determined that objecting would be contrary to 
Defendant's interests. At the least, he could reasonably have concluded that 
objecting would have been futile. Counsel is not required to make futile motions or 
objections. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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2. Defendant has not shown that counsel performed deficiently 
for not objecting to the final sentence of the ''honest belief" 
instruction, because it did not shift the burden of proving the 
fraud element of forgery. 
As stated, Defendant also asserts that the "honest belief' jury instruction 
shifted the burden of proof on the fraud element of forgery and that counsel 
therefore performed deficiently for not objecting to it. Br. Appellant at 21. 
Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because the instruction, by its express terms, 
did not address forgery, let alone imply that Defendant bore the burden of 
disproving the fraud element of forgery. The first sentence of the instruction 
expressly states that a defendant's acting in the honest belief that she had a right to 
obtain property "is a defense to the charge of theft by deception." R94. The phrase 
i 
in the final sentence of the instruction— that "this defense must be presented by the 
defense" — goes only to a defense to theft by deception. It does not address or bear 
on the forgery charge. Moreover, for the reasons given above, the instruction did 
not shift the burden of proof on any element of the offense. Thus, trial counsel was 
not deficient for not objecting to the instruction on the basis that it shifted the 
burden of proof on forgery. 
3. Defendant has not shown that counsel's not objecting to the 
final sentence of the "honest belief" instruction prejudiced 
her. 
For essentially the reasons state above, Defendant also has not proved that 
counsel's not objecting to the instruction prejudiced her. First, as stated, the 
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instruction was correct and clear and did not shift the burden of proof on the 
deception element of theft by deception, the fraud element of forgery, or any other 
element of the offenses. Rather, the instructions clearly provided that the State had 
the burden to prove every element of the offenses. Thus, she had shown no 
reasonable probability of a more favorable result, had defense counsel objected to 
the instruction. 
Moreover, the "honest belief7 instruction was favorable to Defendant. It 
emphasized to the jury that the prosecution was required to prove all the elements 
of the offense. That may have been particularly important in this case, where 
Defendant's only defense was that she claimed to have held an honest belief that the 
account owner signed the check and that she was entitled to cash it.3 
3
 In addition, the State presented overwhelming evidence of Defendant's 
guilt. The teller and the surveillance tape established that Defendant cashed the 
check. See R152:162-64; see also State's Exhibit F. Detective Kirkwood testified to 
Defendant's giving four inconsistent stories of how she came to have the check. 
R156:250-67. Her explanations for the inconsistent stories were illogical. See 
R156:295-308. Because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, counsel's not 
objecting to the jury instruction could not have affected the outcome of the 
proceeding. Thus, even if counsel should have objected to the instruction, 
Defendant has not shown prejudice. See State v. Arnold, 2011 UT App 255, If 6, 688 
Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (holding that Defendants had not demonstrated prejudice based 
on counsel's alleged deficient performance because evidence of their guilt was 
overwhelming). 
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But, even if it could be said that the instruction shifted the burden of proof on 
the theft-by-deception count, it did not shift and could not have shifted the burden 
of proof on the forgery count because the instruction was expressly limited to theft 
by deception. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that trial counsel was deficient 
for not objecting to the "honest belief instruction and that Defendant suffered 
prejudice with respect to her theft-by-deception conviction, Defendant has not 
shown prejudice with respect to her conviction on the forgery count. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT THE BENEFIT OF A LESSER PENALTY 
AFFORDED BY AN AMENDED THEFT STATUTE THAT TOOK 
EFFECT BEFORE SENTENCING 
Based on her taking possession of $360 after passing a forged check, 
Defendant was convicted of theft by deception. See R107. Under Utah law, the 
value of property taken determines the level of theft offenses, including theft by 
deception. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(c) (West 2004). At the time of the offense, 
theft of property valued at $300 or more, but less than $1000, was classified as a class 
A misdemeanor. Id. Effective November 1, 2010, theft of property valued at less 
than $500 was classified as a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 
(West Supp. 2011). Defendant was sentenced seven days later on November 8,2010. 
See R107. 
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Under Utah law, a defendant is "entitled to a lesser sentence when the 
legislature reduces the penalty for the crime charged after conviction but before 
sentencing." See Yates, 918 P.2d at 139; see also Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791, 792-93 
(Utah 1971); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,385 (Utah App. 1997). 
For the first time on appeal, Defendant claims that she was entitled to be 
sentenced to the reduced penalty. Br. Appellant at 3-32. Because of the well-settled 
rule cited above, the State does not contest Defendant's claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not asking that she be convicted and sentenced to a class B 
misdemeanor on the theft-by-deception charge. 
This Court should remand for the trial court to enter Defendant's theft-by-
deception conviction as a class B misdemeanor and resentence her to the reduced 
penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should remand for the trial court to enter 
Defendant's conviction for theft by deception as a class B misdemeanor and to give 
her the benefit of the reduced penalty that was in effect at the time of sentencing. 
The court should affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences in all other respects. 
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76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a 
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(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary 
significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" 
means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a class 
or group. 
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§ 76-6-410.5 
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.CRIMINAL CODE OFFENS 
(d) "Renter" means any person or organization obtaining the use of a 
motor vehicle from a rental company under the terms of a rental agreement. 
(2) A renter is guilty of theft of a rental vehicle if, without notice to and 
permission of the rental company, the renter knowingly fails without good 
cause to return the vehicle within 72 hours after the time established for the 
return in the rental agreement. 
(3) If the motor vehicle is not rented on a periodic tenancy basis, the rental 
company shall include the following information, legibly written, as part of the 
terms of the rental agreement: 
(a) the date and time the motor vehicle is required to be returned; and 
(b) the maximum penalties under state law if the motor vehicle is not 
returned within 72 hours from the date and time stated in compliance with 
Subsection (3)(a). 
Laws 2 0 0 1 , c. 112 , § 1, eff. April 30 , 2 0 0 1 . 
Library References 
Automobiles G=>339. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 48Ak339. 
CJ .S . Motor Vehicles §§ 1511 to 1523. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 1 1 . Repealed by Laws 1974, c. 32, § 41 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 1 2 . Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less 
than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than 
$300. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY § 76-6-412 
Note 1 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-412; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 18; Laws 1975, c. 48, § 1; Laws 
1977 c. 89, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 78, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 14, eff. May 1, 1995; 
Laws 1996, c. 139, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 119, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; 
Laws 1997, c. 289, § 8, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Cross References 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76--4-102. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Indigent Defense Act, see § 77-32-101 et seq. 
Motor vehicles, unauthorized control for extended time, see § 41-la-1314. 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
Rights of Crime Victims Act, see § 77-38-1 et seq. 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
Theft of baggage or cargo, buses, see § 76-10-1508. 
Theft of baggage or cargo, see § 76-10-1508. 
Library References 
Larceny <3=>23, 46, 65, 87. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 234k23; 
234k46; 234k65; 234k87. 
C.J.S. Larceny §§ 60(1) to 65, 115, 129(1), 
159. 
Research References 
ALR Library 
2002 A.L.R.5th 19, What is "Property of An-
other" Within Statute Proscribing Larceny, 
Theft, or Embezzlement of Property of An-
other. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Punitive Damages State-by-State Guide 
§ 8.54, Utah. 
3 Substantive Criminal Law § 19.4, Larceny-
Personal Property of Another. 
3 Substantive Criminal Law § 19.8, Theft 
Crimes: Consolidation. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 405, Property of 
Value. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 432, Property of 
Value. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 450, Property of 
Value. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 464, Taking Prop-
erty by Stealth. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 465, Taking Prop-
erty by Surprise. 
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Attorney fees 15 
Determination of value 3 
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Equal protection 1 
Instructions 12 
Lesser included offense 4 
Presumptions and burden of proof 
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Review 16 
Theft of animals 2 
1. Equal protection 
Statute governing theft of livestock does not 
constitute denial of equal protection on theory 
that there is absence in statute of any reference 
to value of animal stolen in arriving at felonious 
nature of offense charged, as distinction made 
by Legislature between general theft and theft of 
certain animals is one which has historically 
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412 Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for treble damages. 
76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter is punishable: 
(a) as a second degree felony if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a third degree felony if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,500 but is less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of any of the offenses listed in this Subsection (l)(b)(ii), if each 
prior offense was committed within 10 years of the date of the current conviction or the date of the offense upon 
which the current conviction is based: 
(A) theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft; 
(B) any offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, Fraud; or 
(C) any attempt to commit any offense under Subsection (l)(b)(ii)(A) or (B). 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, 
cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal raised for 
commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or exceeds $500 but is less than $1,500; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $500. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or commits theft of property 
described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any 
sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees. 
Amended by Chapter 193, 2010 General Session 
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« Previous Section (76-6-410.5) Next Section (76-6-412.5)» 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Poiicv I ADA Notice 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 76-6-501. Forgery—Elements of offense—"Writing" defined, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-501 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-501 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
Part 5. Fraud 
§ 76-6-501. Forgery—Elements of offense—"Writing" defined 
(1) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording 
valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or 
identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim against property, 
or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters the altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication, or utterance: 
(i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent; 
(ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party with the authority of that other party; or 
(iii) purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when an original did not exist. 
(3) It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if an actor signs his own name to the writing if the 
actor does not have authority to make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter the writing on behalf 
of the party for whom the actor purports to act. 
(4) Forgery is a third degree felony. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-501; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 19; Laws 1975, c. 52, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 15, eff. May 1, 1995; 
Laws 1996, c. 205, § 27, eff April 29, 1996; Laws 2007, c. 141, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2007, c. 141, inserted subsec. (1); redesignated former subsec. (1) as subsec. (2); in subsec. (2)(a) substituted "the" for 
"any such", added designators (2)(b)(i) to (iii), inserted subsec. (2)(b)(ii), and made punctuation changes; deleted former 
subsec. (2) which provided: 
"(2) As used in this section, 'writing' includes printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording 
valuable information including forms such as: 
"(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION 
There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. Ill explain them to you from time 
to time during the trial. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has been given a copy of these 
instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to you, please follow along on 
your copy. Keep in mind the following points: 
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are equally important. Don't pick 
out one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context of all the others. 
Obey Instructions. You must obey the instructions. You are not allowed to reach decisions 
that go against the law. 
Gender - Singular/Plural In these instructions, the masculine gender such as "he" or 
"bim"includes the feminine "she" or "her" and the singular such as "defendant" includes the 
plural "defendants" when appropriate. 
Note Taking. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it 
distract you from following the evidence. The lawyers will review important evidence in 
their closing arguments and help you focus on that which is most relevant to your decision. 
I also caution that notes are not evidence. Use them only to aid personal memory or 
concentration. 
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form an opinion about the ultimate issues in this case until you 
have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the instructions on 
the law. Keep an open mind until then. 
2. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break, 
overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not family, friends or 
even each other. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so that people 
will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the witnesses or 
anyone else connected with the case. You may say "hello", or exchange similar greetings or civilities 
with these persons, but don't engage in conversations. Don't accept from or give to any of these 
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persons any favors, however slight, such as rides or food. Finally, don't read about this case in the 
newspaper or listen to any reports on television or radio. These restraints are necessary for a fair 
trial. 
3. THE GENERAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE LAWYERS 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important roles in 
the trial. 
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and instruct the 
jury on the LAW that it must apply. 
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual issues. Factual 
issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things 
concerning which evidence will be presented. 
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and 
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to 
accept his version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of his client. 
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that is your role. 
Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based 
upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and indicate what 
they think the evidence will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by the 
defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and 
seeing the exhibits offered by the other side. 
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will supplement 
these written instructions and review them with you. 
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Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will 
share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and how 
they think you should decide the case. 
JWV Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and deliberate until 
you reach a verdict. 
5. THE CHARGE(S) and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The 
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be read or 
summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in mind that the 
defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The defendant is presumed to 
be innocent of the charge. 
>t COUNT 1 
FORGERY, (2646) § 76-6-501, Utah Code Ann., as follows: That on or about September 
11, 2009, at 735 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did, 
with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone: 
(a) alter any writing of another without his authority or utters the altered writing; or 
(b) make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance: 
(i) purported to be the act of another, whether the person was existent or 
nonexistent; 
(ii) purported to be an act on behalf of another party with the authority of that 
other party; or 
(iii) purported to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence 
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such 
original existed. 
£ 
COUNT 2 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, (333) § 76-6-405, Utah Code Ann, as follows: That on or 
about September 11, 2009, at 735 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by 
deception, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said 
property was or exceeded $300, but was less than $1,000. 
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6. WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE? 
You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be based only on the 
evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on speculation. Don't guess about 
any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions 
from the evidence presented. 
7. WHAT IS EVIDENCE? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. It 
can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or certain qualified 
opinions, or any combination of these things. Some times the lawyers may agree that certain 
facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as having been proved. In limited 
instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. If this happens, I will explain how 
you should treatdt. 
8. OPINION TESTIMONY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A person who 
by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, may 
give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert) is also allowed to express an 
opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to understanding his testimony or 
the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other 
evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things which do not 
qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not consider in reaching 
your verdict. ^ 
Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant of 
committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. 
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Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the range of 
potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment the defendant 
may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based upon the applicable law. 
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't consider 
that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused person has the right 
not to testify and you should not draw any negative inferences based upon the reliance on 
this right. 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give you a 
preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the evidence from their 
viewpoint. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. You should 
not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make personal inspections, 
observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or articles not produced in 
court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for you. Don't look for information in 
law books, dictionaries or public or private records which are not produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or read about 
this casein the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court communication. You 
must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court. 
10. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for the jury 
to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection 
is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it. If an objection is 
OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you 
should ignore it. 
11. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it should be 
believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it. 
jurcrimins 6/15/00 Page 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. Review all the 
evidence. Don't imagine things which have no evidence to back them up. Consider the evidence 
fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side. 
12. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS 
As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is. It may help you 
to ask yourself questions such as these: 
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial comes out? 
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain way? 
Demeanor: What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct while 
answering questions? 
Consistent. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other evidence? 
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and 
the ability to remember them? 
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience? 
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe one 
witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
13. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to 
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that 
witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what 
weight you think it deserves. 
14. QUESTIONS BY JURORS DURING THE TRIAL 
A jury member may direct questions to the judge or to a witness by writing the question 
on a piece of paper and handing it to the bailiff who will hand it to me. I will share the same 
with the lawyers who have the right to express an opinion as to whether it is proper. If the 
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question is not one that is allowed under the rules of evidence or is otherwise improper, I will tell 
you. Otherwise, the question will generally be allowed. 
I remind you that the lawyers are trained in asking questions that will produce the 
evidence necessary to decide this case. However, if you feel there is something important that 
has been missed or that needs clarification, you may ask a question by complying with the 
procedure outlined in this instruction. 
15. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the accusations in this case. 
The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. According to 
our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard against the danger of an innocent 
person being unjustly punished. 
16. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption the defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
17- WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation, 
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would maike a reasonable person 
hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as would be retained by 
reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must 
arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
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18. HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT 
If after such full and impartial consideration some possible doubt exists, you must 
determine whether such doubt is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the 
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law does not require that the evidence 
dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt. That is 
what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". 
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19. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which 
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. These 
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-eight (28). We will read those after 
completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to the procedure that 
you should follow. 
20. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss 
this case: 
a. all exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. your notes (if any); 
c. your copy of these instructions; and 
d. the verdict form or forms. 
21. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This 
person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair." The Chair's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b. to represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
c. to sign your verdict and bring it back in court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no more power 
than any other juror. 
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22. CONSIDER EACH OTHER'S OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN 
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION 
It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. 
When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may block appropriate consideration of 
the case. Use your common memory, your common understanding and your common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. 
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with everyone else. 
However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. If you are persuaded 
that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate to change your mind. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other than 
honest deliberation. 
23. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the 
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate. 
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based 
upon the evidence. 
24. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a 
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or 
collective views about anything other than the guilt or innocence of this defendant. Your verdict 
should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law as explained in these instructions and 
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will 
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a 
just and proper verdict. 
25. REACHING A VERDICT 
This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When 
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished. 
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26. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict form which 
corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to court. 
27. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of you about 
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave 
at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to watch the rest of the proceedings, 
which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not 
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to 
do that, please tell the Court Clerk. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. j g 
Punishment is not relevant to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. In making 
your decision do not consider what punishment could result from a verdict of guilty, 
not let any bias, sympathy or prejudice that you may feel toward one side or the other 
influence your decision in any way. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. X°i 
Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The law does not treat one type 
of evidence as better than the other. 
Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. It usually comes from a witness who perceived 
firsthand the fact in question. For example, if a witness testified he looked outside and 
saw it was raining, that would be direct evidence that it had rained. 
Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence. It usually comes from a witness who 
perceived a set of related events, but not the fact in question. However, based on that 
testimony someone could conclude that the fact in question had occurred. For example, if 
a witness testified that she looked outside and saw that the ground was wet and people 
were closing their umbrellas, that would be circumstantial evidence that it had rained. 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be enough evidence— 
direct, circumstantial, or some of both—to convince you of the defendant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. It is up to you to decide. 
<Q-1 
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The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted with a particular mental state. Ordinarily, there is no way that a 
defendant's mental state can be proved directly, because no one can tell what another 
person is thinking. A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the 
surrounding facts and circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, 
what the defendant did, and any other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's 
mind. 
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The defendant MICHELLE ANN COX, is charged in Count I with FORGERY in 
r 
violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-501, as amended, You 
cannot convict defendant of this offense unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt, 
based on the evidence, each of the following elements: 
1. That the defendant MICHELLE ANN COX: 
2. in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. acting with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that she was 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone; 
4. (a) altered any writing of another without his authority or uttered the altered 
writing; or 
(b) made, completed, executed, authenticated, issued, transferred, published, or 
uttered any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance issuance, transference, publication, or utterance : (i) purported 
to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent; or (ii) purported 
to be an act on behalf of another party with the authority of that other party; or (iii) 
purported to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original OC*^rf 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that 
each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant NOT GUILTY. 
In reaching your decision, the following shall apply. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly or with knowledge 
with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
To commit forgery, one must possess the specific intent to defraud anyone; that is, the 
state need not prove exactly who the defendant intended to defraud, provided the state 
can prove that the defendant acted with the requisite intent to defraud. 
"Writing" includes printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method 
of recording valuable information including such forms as: (a) checks, tokens, stamps, 
seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbol of value, right, 
privilege, or identification; or (b) a check, or any other instrument or writing representing 
an interest in or acclaim against property or a pecuniary interest in or claim against a 
person or enterprise. 
"Completing" a signed check includes the act of inserting a name on the blank 
payee line of the signed check, or inserting the amount to be paid on the signed. 
"Uttering" a writing includes passing the writing to another. The act of 
presenting a check for payment or the act of cashing cashing a check are acts which 
constitute "uttering" a check. 
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It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if an actor 
signs his or her own name to the writing if the actor does not have authority to make, 
complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter the writing on behalf of 
the party for whom the actor purports to act. 
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The defendant, MICHELLE ANN COX, is charged in Count II with THEFT BY 
DECEPTION,; , in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-405, 
as amended. You cannot convict her of this offense unless you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt, based on the evidence, each of the following elements: 
1. That the defendant MICHELLE ANN COX, 
2. in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. obtained or exercised control over the property of another ; 
4. by deception and with a purpose to deprive the other thereof; and 
£* the value of said property was or exceeded $300.00 but was less 
than $1,000.00 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that 
each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of 
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant NOT GUILTY. 
In reaching your decision, the following shall apply. 
"Property" means anything of value. "Property" includes but is not limited to 
tangible and intangible personal property, and written instruments or other writings 
representing or embodying rights concerning personal property or otherwise containing 
anything of value to the owner. 
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A person engages in conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly or with knowledge 
with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
"Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect 
the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object to : 
(a) Withhold property permanently, or 
(b) Dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
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It is a defense to the charge of theft by deception that the Defendant: 
(a) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved; or 
(b) acted in the honest belief that she had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service involved; or 
(c) obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly believing 
that the owner, if present /would have consented. 
Evidence of this defense must be presented by the defense, and if presented 
the State retains its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of 
the offense charged. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHELLE ANN COX, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 101901166 
We, the jurors in the above case find the defendant, MICHELLE ANN COX, as 
follows: 
Count 1: FORGERY 
Not Guilty 
Guilty 
Count 2: THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Not Guilty 
Guilty 
Dated this day of August, 2010 
Foreperson 
Filed ,2010 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
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76-2-103. Definitions. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of 
his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with laiowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
•"" laiowingiy,~ur with knowledge, with respect to a res alt of his conduct when he is aware thathis 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
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